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We agree with Webb's point that discussions of the importance and novelty of "synthesis" in 
ALife and AB have sometimes obscured the fact that these are fundamentally model-building 
enterprises.  It's true that standard practice in ALife and AB is to construct a program or a robot, 
and on the surface this can look different to the theories-and-experiments approach of normal 
science.  The picture is further complicated by the fact that many researchers have engineering 
goals as well as biological ones.  However, to the extent that ALife and AB are going to teach us 
anything about biology, it's important to recognize that they will do so not by becoming 
independent of laboratory and field work but by giving us new ways to understand empirical 
data.   Webb is right to remind us all of how contributions to biology are made.  
 
It follows that we applaud Webb's attack on the ontological mumbo-jumbo of the strong ALife 
position.  "It's alive!" is the Frankensteinian claim of the strong ALifer.  Like Webb, we cannot 
agree.  It's not alive, it's a formal model instantiated as a computer program, and the map should 
not be mistaken for the territory.  ALife's ability to ask counter-factual questions (e.g., "what 
would it be like if there were more than two sexes?") no more licenses talk of a new, alternate 
reality than does the ability of a mundane traffic simulation to ask "what would London be like 
with more motorways?".  Webb is right to point out that some ALife and AB authors have used 
the "life as it could be" position to dodge their responsibility to make reference to real biology.  
 
We further agree that Webb offers the right rebuttal for those who want to use ALife creations 
as "source models", in the same sense as using a pump as a model for the function of the heart. 
 (Webb suggests this interpretation of Langton's 1989 "alternative biology" position.)  An ALife 
simulation is not an independent real-world object but an artifact that has been constructed with 
strong influences from biological theory.  It is therefore already a theoretical model, and we 
should not be surprised when it turns out to resemble the real-world target system in some way.  
 
Thus we find much to agree with in Webb's paper.  However, we are uncomfortable with the 
narrowness of a view on modelling that dismisses Beer's (2003a) work on minimally cognitive 
agents.  Frankly, we are suspicious of an analysis that places the over-complex, over-optimistic 
multi-scale modelling effort of the Psikharpax project (Meyer et al., 2005) in the "good" column while placing Beer's simplicity, clear reasoning, and careful analysis in the "bad" column.  We see 
Beer as part of a long tradition of useful, simple and abstract models in the cognitive and 
biological sciences.  So where do we part company with Webb in her view of legitimate 
modelling practices?  
 
Webb argues that model builders must have a target system in mind, they must develop a 
hypothesis about how that target system works, and they are then justified in building a model if 
the hypothesis is complex enough to be non-obvious in its implications.  In other words, the 
model's purpose is to spell out the consequences of the various assumptions in a complicated 
theory.  We think that's not a bad description of what modelling is (although see Di Paolo et al., 
2000, for a more complete account) but we disagree with Webb on the range of epistemological 
payoffs one can expect from this activity.  For Webb, the result of a successful modelling venture 
is increased support for a particular view of the rather specific target system, e.g., one becomes 
more confident that cricket phonotaxis actually works thus rather than so.  We believe that there 
are other things that can usefully be done with models.  For example, building speculative or 
highly abstract models that are designed to develop or to "try on for size" a new paradigm seems 
to us legitimate.  Of course, this is what Beer is doing: his over-arching goal (Beer, 1997) is to use 
models of simple agents to explore the utility of the dynamical systems perspective as a new way 
of understanding cognition.    
 
It would be a shame if Webb's restricted view of what models are good for was to become 
universally accepted in the ALife and AB community.  Of course, models of specific behaviours 
in specific animals, with model outputs being compared directly to empirical data, are a valuable 
contribution, and Webb is probably right that it would be healthy if there was more work like 
this in the literature.   However, ALife and AB are well placed to do more than this.  Traits, 
capacities, and behaviours that are shared across many organisms (e.g., the capacity to hear, anti-
predator observation, possessing an immune system, etc.) can be investigated in general and their 
likely evolutionary histories outlined in advance of more detailed investigations with reference to 
a particular species.  These kinds of simple, general models can be especially useful in clarifying 
conceptual issues on the border between theoretical biology and the philosophy of biology, e.g., 
the origin of intelligence (Godfrey-Smith, 1998), the relationship between agent-level and mechanistic descriptions of behaviour (de Pinedo & Noble, 2008), and the possibility of selection 
occurring at levels other than the gene (Powers, et al., 2008).  
 
We think that the problem with Webb's analysis is rooted in her dichotomy between "specific" 
and "invented" animal models, and we reject this dichotomy.  There is a presumably unintended 
pun at work when Webb talks about "specific" animal models: all of her examples are pitched at 
the level of species.  We note that classical (non-computational) models from game theory, such 
as the Hawk-Dove game (Maynard Smith & Price 1973), have been usefully applied to real 
biology but cannot be said to be models of a "specific animal".  Does Webb intend to privilege 
the species as the only level of biological organization at which she thinks useful models can be 
made, or is this a coincidence of the examples she has chosen?  We are unsure, but we cannot 
see why much more general categories (e.g., animals or plants) are not also valid objects for 
model-building.  Consider von Neumann's model of a self-replicating machine, originally 
presented in lectures in 1948 and 1949, and surely a progenitor of modern ALife models.   von 
Neumann showed that a self-replicating system needs to be able to treat key parts of its structure 
as both code and data, and in doing so he anticipated Watson and Crick's results on the double 
helix by several years.  von Neumann's machine is not a model of any particular animal; it is an 
abstract model of an invented system, exploring the general logical requirements for self-
replication.  Is it worthless as an exercise in modelling?  We think not.  
 
Webb tolerates a certain amount of invention or creativity in model-building, in that she accepts 
that models may be imperfect or imprecise or pitched at differing levels of explanation, and that 
a hypothesis may sometimes be just a wild guess about how some real-world process might 
work.   On this we agree completely: there is more value in being usefully wrong than being 
silent.  We suspect that Webb is annoyed with "invented animal" work because of a tendency in 
the ALife and AB literature to noodle around with model-like structures that are not true models 
but undirected fictions.  Certainly the language used in Dennett's 1978 paper now seems 
inflammatory, and if Dennett is taken as saying "Why bother with the biological details, let's just 
make something up" then we can see why Webb has a problem with this.  It's true that whereas 
tightly targeted work like Webb's own has the obvious success criterion of being a good or a bad 
match to real data, some of the more speculative ALife and AB work has much more vague success criteria: how long should Beer's modelling project continue before the weight of 
evidence pushes us one way or another on the utility of the dynamical systems perspective on 
cognition, for example?  This is a tough question, but we feel Webb is wrong to reject everything 
more general than empirically linked species-specific modelling simply because the success 
criteria for the more speculative work are not as crisp as we might like them to be.  The problem 
is not that proofs of concept and conceptual exploration are worthless, far from it.  The problem 
is perhaps that some researchers in the ALife community seem to be happy to keep re-
discovering the same principles again and again: for example, we do not need any more papers 
where the chief contribution to knowledge is a demonstration that complex global behaviour can 
arise from simple local rules.    
 
In conclusion: we agree that ALife and AB is, or should be, all about model-building.  And we 
want to stress that if Webb's paper is read as a cry for more rigour and less chaff in the ALife 
and AB literature, we very much agree.  We feel, however, that Webb is unfortunately prejudiced 
in favour of the level of precision and detail that she uses in her own modelling projects.  Levins 
(1966) and other analysts of the modelling enterprise have outlined dimensions that must be 
traded off when building a model, e.g., in Levins's case, precision, generality, and realism.  Points 
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